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The Army currently uses time series models to forecast active-duty enlisted personnel 
losses. These time series models can provide accurate predictions but offer no insights 
into the underlying causes of loss behavior. In order to quantify the various forces that 
influence retention rates, a regression model is necessary. In this thesis, logistic 
regression is used to estimate end of term-of-service (ETS) losses. The model estimates 
the probability of reenlistment for soldiers with 12 months remaining on their enlistment 
contract. The model relies largely on individual soldier information such as pay grade, 
military occupation, and education, but also examines the impact of the civilian 
unemployment rate. Two models are developed. The first model includes 14 main effects. 
The second model includes the same 14 main effects plus 21 highly significant two-way 
interaction terms. Both models estimate the total number of personnel that reenlist in a 
seven-month test period fairly well, although the main-effects model results are more 
accurate. The two-way interaction model performs slightly better on most statistical 
measures of model effectiveness. Because the two-way interaction model is more 
complicated to produce, and does not generate results that are clearly better than the main 
effects model, this thesis recommends using the main effects model to complement the 
current set of time series models.  
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The Army currently uses time series models to forecast active-duty enlisted personnel 
losses. These time series models can provide accurate predictions but offer no insights 
into the underlying causes of loss behavior. In order to quantify the various forces that 
influence retention rates, a regression model is necessary. In this thesis, logistic 
regression is used to estimate the probability of reenlistment for soldiers with 12 months 
remaining on their enlistment contract. 
The data set used in this thesis was provided by the Army G-1 and consists of 84 
monthly snapshots of the entire active component enlisted force over a seven-year period 
from October 2005 through September 2012. Each snapshot contains more than 400,000 
soldier records and nearly 200 fields. Based on a review of attrition and retention 
literature, 13 fields that are likely to be good predictors of reenlistment decisions are 
selected. The 13 variables are gender, term of service, pay grade, reenlistment eligibility, 
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) score, military occupational specialty (MOS), 
marital status, number of dependents, number of administrative flags, race, education 
level, type of accession, and months of active federal service. Two other variables that 
were not part of the original data set are also examined: the civilian unemployment rate 
and the consumer confidence index. After evaluating each of the variables one at a time 
and collectively, all of the variables except consumer confidence index are found to be 
good predictors. From there two models are developed. The first model includes the 14 
main effects. The second model includes the same 14 main effects plus 21 highly 
significant two-way interaction terms. Both models estimate the total number of 
personnel that reenlist in a seven-month test period fairly well, although the main effects 
model results are more accurate. The two-way interaction model performs slightly better 
on most statistical measures of model effectiveness. Because the two-way interaction 
model is more complicated to produce, and does not generate results that are clearly 
better than the main effects model, this thesis recommends using the main effects model 
to complement the current set of time series models. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
The Army continually manages its personnel in order to both maximize alignment 
with force structure requirements, and maintain end strength at congressionally mandated 
levels. Accurate loss estimates are particularly important because they allow the Army to 
adjust recruiting, retention, and promotion policies in order to shape the force more 
effectively. Overestimating Army-wide losses could result in an oversized force that must 
cut funding from training or research budgets in order to pay the extra personnel, while 
underestimating losses could result in an undersized force that is unable to fill critical 
positions.   
The Army G-1 staff uses several different time series techniques, such as 
weighted averages, exponential smoothing, and auto-regression, to forecast personnel 
losses. Time series techniques are particularly powerful when the process of interest is 
stationary. Stationarity simply means that the distribution of the outcomes are constant 
over time. When a process is stationary, the future will look a lot like the past. But this is 
often not the case with personnel losses because important factors regarding soldier 
retention can change. For example, the availability of jobs in the civilian economy, the 
intensity and duration of military conflicts, and the size of reenlistment bonuses being 
offered can all change over time. Although time series techniques can be designed to 
react to new trends and seasonal factors, they are reactive in nature. New trends must 
manifest themselves for a while before a time series model can adjust. Also, the current 
set of time series models provide no information about why the retention process is 
behaving in a certain way. In order to adjust manpower policies effectively, decision 
makers must understand the factors that influence retention rates. For instance, how will a 
small increase in reenlistment bonuses affect retention rates?  Are retention rates likely to 
change once the war in Afghanistan ends?  Which soldiers are the most sensitive to these 
changes?  The answers to these types of questions require a different approach. 
 2 
B. PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this study is to determine whether multivariate regression 
modeling can be used to forecast Army active component enlisted retention rates. In 
particular, the study utilizes logistic regression to estimate the probability of soldier 
reenlistment based on information available 12 months prior to the end of their term of 
service (ETS). Logistic regression is appropriate when the response variable has only two 
outcomes. In this case, soldiers are either retained in the Army or become a loss once 
they reach their ETS date. For modeling purposes, soldiers that extend their current 
contract or reenlist under a new contract are considered retained. Soldiers that become a 
loss at the end of their contract, and soldiers that are involuntarily extended by the Army 
stop-loss policy, are considered losses. The 12-month mark is significant because 
historically most soldiers could not reenlist until they were within 12 months of their ETS 
date. In order to make reenlistment predictions for soldiers who are closer to their ETS 
date, additional models would need to be developed, but 12 months is a good starting 
point to see if the concept is useful. The study primarily assesses the statistical 
significance of individual soldier characteristics since personnel data is already 
maintained by the Army and is readily available. Once suitable models have been 
developed, they can be applied to soldiers in the current inventory that are within their 
reenlistment window. If these results are combined with an attrition model for soldiers 
that are not in their reenlistment window, a retention probability can be determined for 
every soldier in the inventory for any month within the next year. Then the results can be 
aggregated in whatever manner the Army would like. For instance, the Army could easily 
determine the expected number of losses next September by rank and military 
occupational specialty (MOS) using a pivot table. 
C. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
Chapter II describes attrition and retention literature that is relevant to this study. 
The literature has been broken into two groups. The first group consists of studies that 
identify potential covariates for the model. The second group focuses on the analytic 
techniques used to model retention. Chapter III describes the data set and the model 
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building process. Chapter IV assesses the fit of the model through summary measures and 
cross validation. Chapter V will summarize the important insights and make 
recommendations for follow-up research. 
 4 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. POTENTIAL COVARIATES 
1. Factors Affecting Future Levels of Military Personnel 
a. Education and Aptitude Testing 
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) cites two previous studies to 
support the claim that “recruits that are better educated or who score higher on aptitude 
tests are more likely to…stay in the Army” [1, p. 6].  Because of this conclusion, the 
Department of Defense (DoD) has two major goals for the quality of its recruits. First, at 
least 90 percent of non-prior service (NPS) recruits should be high school graduates. 
Second, at least 60 percent of NPS recruits should score at or above the 50th percentile 
on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) [1, p. 6].  
b.  Pay and Reenlistment Bonuses 
In 2000, the Congress authorized that annual increases in basic pay be 
0.5 percent more than the increase in civilian wages, and also increased housing 
allowances and other pay significantly [1, pp. 12-13]. This was designed to close a 
perceived pay gap between military personnel and civilian employees. Between 2001 and 
2005, the average regular military compensation (RMC) for the entire active duty enlisted 
force increased almost 14 percent, adjusted for inflation [1, p. 13]. This was significantly 
higher than comparable civilian wages and leads the CBO to conclude that the increase in 
compensation should increase retention of first-term active-duty personnel by 25 percent 
[1, p. 13]. 
In 2005, the active Army began a serious effort to improve retention rates. 
In April 2005 it extended its reenlistment window for soldiers from 12 months to 24 
months prior to the expiration of their contract [1, p. 10]. The Army also increased the 
Deployed Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) from $5,000 to $15,000. As a result of 
these two policies, the active Army spent more on SRBs in 2005 than it spent in the 
previous four years combined [1, p. 14]. The CBO also notes that SRBs are unnecessary 
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for soldiers with 11 or more years of service because of the lure of retirement pay, which 
is available after 20 years of service [1, p. 23]. 
c. Military Occupation and the Civilian Economy 
The CBO identifies eight MOSs that may have been subject to increasing 
civilian competition associated with the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 
general they find that the Army is able to successfully overcome the increase in civilian 
competition by increasing SRBs [1, pp. 22–25].  
d. Deployments 
The CBO examines a variety of research regarding the effect of 
deployments and finds that the effect of hostile deployments prior to September 11, 2001, 
on retention is generally positive. In the post-September 11 era, the effect is mixed. In 
some cases the deployments had no effect on retention, while in other cases they were 
associated with lower retention. Some of the factors that negatively impacted retention 
included the stress associated with long work hours both prior to and during deployments, 
uncertainties surrounding deployment dates, short-notice deployments, insufficient 
downtime between deployments, and family separation [1, pp. 27–29]. 
e. Miscellaneous 
The CBO notes that educational benefits such as the Montgomery GI Bill, 
which are designed to improve recruiting efforts, may also discourage reenlistments. This 
is because soldiers must get out of the Army in order to utilize their benefit by attending 
college full-time [1, p. 20]. 
The CBO briefly mentions several other factors that affect retention such 
as promotion opportunities, job conditions, and time away from home, but does not 
examine these effects in further detail [1, p. 22]. 
2. The Effect of Deployments on Service Members 
Based on results of focus groups and surveys, the authors of [2] reach many of the 
same conclusions as the CBO regarding the effect of deployments on retention. Family 
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separation, long work hours, and uncertainty about deployment dates and duties are all 
considered negative aspects of deployments. On a positive note, they find that unit 
cohesion and deployment pay can offset some of the negative aspects of deployments. 
They also find that service members appreciate the opportunity to participate in 
meaningful missions. 
3. Expectations About Civilian Employment Opportunities 
The authors of [3] argue that retention depends on service members’ expectations 
about military and civilian compensation, not on actual compensation [3, p. 12]. 
Unfortunately, they also find that Army officers are particularly prone to overestimating 
the ease of finding and keeping civilian employment, and underestimate the costs of 
many military benefits such as healthcare [3, p. 10]. They also point out that gender and 
race pay differentials are more common in the private sector, which can result in higher 
retention of female and black officers [3, pp. 39-42]. 
4. Cash Incentives for Reenlistment 
The authors of [4] state that reenlistment rates were fairly stable between 1996 
and 2007. Then in 2006 and 2007 the increased number of long deployments caused the 
effect of deployments on retention, which had been positive, to become negative. The 
Army responded by increasing SRBs, and by 2009 the economic recession also began to 
improve retention [4, p. xiii]. The authors state that “bonuses were a critical tool for the 
Army in meeting its retention objectives in FY 2007 [4, p. xvii].”  They also point out 
that bonuses are more cost-effective than across-the-board pay increases because the 
amount can vary, and they can be targeted to occupations with shortages [4, p. xxi]. 
5. What Soldiers Say About Career Continuance 
Based on interviews and focus groups conducted in fiscal years 2006 and 2007 
(FY06 & FY07), the authors of [5] identify numerous factors affecting both attrition and 
retention in the Army. Attrition in this context refers to soldiers that fail to complete their 
contractual term of service, while retention refers to soldier decisions about reenlisting or 
extending their contract. The factors affecting retention are similar to the results obtained 
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from the other studies, and have already been described. Some of the factors affecting 
attrition, however, are different, and could also be relevant to this study because soldiers 
may attrite during their reenlistment window before reaching their ETS date. The authors 
find that the factors influencing attrition include mental stability, misconduct, adjustment 
to Army life, and family related issues such as being a single parent. 
6. The Effect of Military Pay 
The authors of [6] argue that the time is right for DoD to begin reducing military 
pay increases for at least three reasons. First, the recruiting and retention climate is 
excellent in part because of high unemployment rates and rapidly rising college tuition 
costs. Second, DoD is planning to reduce the size of the force, which will reduce recruiting 
and retention goals. Third, due to steady military pay increases between 2000 and 2010, 
and stagnant civilian wages during the same period, Army median RMC grew from the 
60th  percentile to the 80th percentile of comparable civilian wages (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1.   Real Civilian Wages and Median RMC, 2000–2009, in 2010 Dollars. From 
[6, Fig. 3.1]. 
During this same time period, civilian health plan premiums increased 
approximately 150 percent—a growth rate that far exceeded the 31 percent increase in 
the cost of living [6, p. xiii]. The authors believe that the combination of improved pay 
and increasingly valuable healthcare benefits should keep retention rates high for the 
foreseeable future. 
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7. Summary of Potential Covariates 
From the CBO report [1] it appears that education, AFQT score, and Montgomery 
GI Bill status may be important predictors. Number of deployments is also worth 
examining but there may be interaction effects with family oriented variables such as 
marital status and number of dependents, as well as financial variables such as pay and 
bonuses. MOS may interact with deployments since soldiers with combat MOSs are 
likely to have a more stressful and dangerous experience than support MOSs. MOS is 
also worth examining in its own right since some occupations are experiencing more 
competition from civilian employers than others. 
From the Army officer study [3] it appears that race and gender should be 
examined. Also, a variable which measures perceptions about the civilian economy, such 
as the consumer confidence index, may be as important or even more important than 
actual measures of the economy like the unemployment rate. 
The cash incentives study [4] makes it clear that the size and availability of 
reenlistment bonuses are an important factor. The study also claims that the relationship 
between deployments and reenlistments is nonlinear, and reinforces the importance of 
economic variables such as the unemployment rate. 
The career continuance study [5] shows that many of the factors that influence 
attrition are not the same as the factors that influence retention. In particular, mental 
stability, misconduct, and family issues could be important predictors. 
Finally, the military pay study [6] clearly illustrates the gains in overall 
compensation that Army personnel have made relative to civilian employees over the last 
decade. A variable that could quantify the pay gap between military and civilian 
personnel would be ideal. 
B. POTENTIAL ANALYTIC METHODS 
1. A Loss Model Built for the Air Force 
The authors of [7] develop several models in order to make monthly loss 
projections for the entire enlisted force. They build attrition and ETS loss models for 
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first-term, second-term, and career-term personnel, as well as models for personnel who 
become losses during an extension period, and for retirement losses. The authors examine 
four approaches to time series modeling: constant rate, regression, autoregressive, and 
straight line running average [7, pp. 7–11]. 
a. Constant Rate Models 
In a constant rate model the observed differences from month to month are 
the result of random, uncorrelated disturbances to the system, or noise, and the model has 
the following form: 
 ( ) ( )r t c e t= +  
where  ( )r t   is the attrition rate at time t, 
 ( )e t  is the error at time t, and 
 c  is a constant (the mean of the time series). 
b. Regression Models 
A regression model is appropriate when the data exhibits a dependence on 
another set of variables. For instance, the attrition rate at time t, ( )r t , might depend on an 
airman’s salary at time t, ( )s t . This simple linear regression model has the form 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )r t c a s t e t= + +  
where  c   is the intercept, 
 a  is the slope of the linear relationship, and 
 ( )e t  is the normally independently distributed error term with mean zero. 
c. Autoregressive Models 
An autoregressive model is useful when the output depends on its own 
previous values. For instance, in a first order autoregressive model the next observation 
depends only on the last observation, and has the form 
( ) ( ) ( 1) ( )r t c a r t e t= + − +  
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where  c  is a constant term that incorporates the mean of the time series and the 
autoregressive coefficients, and ( )e t  is the normally independently distributed error term 
with mean zero. 
d. Straight Line Running Average Models 
A straight line running average model uses the average of the most recent 
k months to predict the attrition rate. For example, a 12-month straight line running 
average is found by summing the previous 12 months of losses and dividing that total by 
the sum of the previous 12 start-of-month inventories. The model can also incorporate a 
seasonal adjustment factor for each calendar month. This type of model has the following 
form: 
( ) [ ( )][ ( )]r t s t x t=  
where  ( )r t   is the attrition rate at time t, 
 ( )s t  is the seasonal adjustment factor for calendar month t, and 
 ( )x t  is the 12-month straight line running average. 
The authors of [7] used a regression model to project first term ETS losses [7, p. 31]. ETS 
cohorts were formed containing all the airmen in the Air Force 12 months prior to their 
ETS date. They used such variables as the fraction of the cohort lost before the ETS year, 
and the fraction of the cohort that extended. The airmen were also partitioned into groups 
based on education, term of enlistment (i.e., the number of years of enlisted obligation), 
and pay grade. Second-term and career-term ETS losses were projected using a variety of 
autoregressive and constant rate models [7, pp. 41, 46, 50]. 
2. A Reenlistment Model Built for the Navy 
Nelson [8] identifies several shortcomings with the current regression models 
used by the Navy to predict reenlistment rates, then makes some recommendations for 
improving the models. The Navy currently uses three separate models based on time-in-
service. Zone A includes sailors with 17 months to 6 years of service, Zone B includes 
sailors between 6 and 10 years of service, and Zone C includes sailors between 10 and 14 
years of service. The variables for the models include end strength, unemployment rate, 
 12 
and attrition rate over the past 11 to 15 years. The model shortcomings include violations 
of mathematical assumptions, inclusion of insignificant variables, and inclusion of 
variables that are themselves predictions. Because the Navy performs regression on time 
series data, Nelson checks to see if the data is uncorrelated and finds some instances 
where the residuals are not independent. He also finds that the unemployment rate is not a 
statistically significant predictor and should be removed from the model.  
3. A Loss Model Built for the Marine Corps 
Orrick [9] uses logistic regression to identify Marines that are likely to attrite 
prior to their ETS date. He initially evaluates the following variables: AFQT score, 
number of dependents, years of service, age at enlistment, accession location by Marine 
Corps district, education level, marital status, separation code, contract length, race, and a 
binary variable indicating if the Marine has combat experience. For each variable, a 
baseline level is selected and then dummy variables are created for each of the remaining 
levels. Orrick finds that nearly all of the variables are statistically significant. He then 
uses data splitting to validate the model. Orrick claims that the model was able to 
correctly classify Marines who would attrite over 76 percent of the time. 
4. Summary of Analytic Methods 
The first two studies, [7] and [8] , make it clear that different types of models may 
be appropriate for different segments of the military population. In particular, attrition 
and retention should be modeled separately, and relatively new service members are 
typically influenced by different factors than experienced service members. The third 
study [9] confirms that logistic regression can be used to successfully predict attrition, 
and many of the covariates used in the study were similar to the ones already identified in 
previous literature. 
C. SUMMARY OF LITERATURE REVIEW 
Most of the literature reviewed in this thesis focuses on attrition rather than 
retention, and examines either the DoD as a whole or focuses on military services other 
than the Army.  There was even one study that examines Army officers, but not enlisted 
personnel [3].  By focusing on Army enlisted retention, this thesis attempts to determine 
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both the shared characteristics and the differences between Army personnel and other 
service members, enlisted personnel and officers, and attrition and retention. 
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III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A. DATA SUMMARY 
This study utilizes two data sets which were provided by the Army G-1. The first 
data set is called the “301” file. The 301 file consists of 84 monthly snapshots of the entire 
active component enlisted force from October 2005 through September 2012 (i.e., a seven-
year period from FY06 to FY12). Each snapshot contains more than 400,000 soldier 
records and nearly 200 fields. The second data set is called the “351” file. The 351 file 
contains information about monthly personnel actions over the same seven-year period as 
the 301 file. Personnel actions recorded in the 351 file include gains, losses, reenlistments, 
extensions, promotions, and demotions. Each record also includes an identification number 
so that personnel actions can be linked to individual data in the 301 file. 
Since this study focuses on estimating the probability of reenlistment for soldiers 
who are 12 months from their ETS date, the 301 file was filtered to include only these 
soldiers. Each record was then joined to loss and reenlistment records in the 351 file with 
matching identification numbers in the next 14 months. A 14-month window was 
selected in order to include personnel actions that were not recorded until shortly after the 
ETS month. In a small number of cases, individual soldiers had more than one personnel 
action during their reenlistment window. For instance, a soldier might extend early in the 
window and then reenlist or become a loss later in the window. In these cases, 
reenlistment and loss data were used to determine whether a soldier was retained or lost, 
and extension and stop-loss information was ignored. Extension and stop-loss 
information was used only when there was no record of reenlistment or loss. 
B. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
1. Overview of the Data Set 
Because of the need to look 14 months into the future in order to determine if a 
soldier was retained, and difficulties incorporating the first three months of the data set, 
only 67 monthly snapshots from January 2006 to September 2012 were actually used in 
this analysis. The total number of soldiers who were 12 months from their ETS date 
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(METS) during this period was 300,788. Nearly 42 percent of these soldiers eventually 
reenlisted or extended, and the remaining 58 percent became losses or were held under 
the stop-loss policy. Figure 2 shows that the retention rate was particularly low in the first 
few months of the data set, then spiked briefly, and hovered around the average 
thereafter. The monthly average number of soldiers with 12 METS was 4,489 with a 
standard deviation of 988. Because of this large amount of monthly variation, it will be 
important for loss planners to track these fluctuations. 
 
Figure 2.   Monthly Number of Soldiers at 12 METS, and Percent of Soldiers That 
Were Retained  
2. Covariates 
Although the data set includes nearly 200 variables, many of these were unlikely 
to have any impact on the decision to reenlist. Some of the others were highly redundant. 
For instance, there were at least four slightly different ways to measure education level. 
Some variables contained too many levels to be useful, and some contained too many 
errors or omissions. Based on these constraints and the information obtained in the 
literature review, 15 covariates were examined for inclusion in the model. These 
covariates are examined in greater detail in section D of this chapter. 
Unfortunately, the data set does not contain enough information to model the 
effect of deployments accurately. Although information was available about overseas 
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tours, which include non-combat assignments, it could not be filtered to include only 
combat deployments. The data set also does not contain enough information about 
reenlistment bonuses to determine the amount of money soldiers were eligible to receive 
for reenlisting. This would undoubtedly be a very difficult number to quantify because 
bonus amounts often depend on many factors such as whether or not the soldier is 
deployed, time in service, and the length of the reenlistment contract just to name a few. 
These issues are addressed again in the Follow-up Research Recommendations Section of 
Chapter V. 
C. LOGISTIC REGRESSION 
One of the distinguishing characteristics between logistic regression and linear 
regression is that the response variable in logistic regression is binary [10, p. 1]. Binary 
variables are typically represented by a value of one if the event of interest occurs, and a 
value of zero if it does not. Expected values between zero and one can then be interpreted 
as the probability that the event will occur. If linear regression is applied to a binary 
response variable it can produce probabilities that are less than zero or greater than one, 
which are by definition impossible. Instead of a linear relationship between the covariates 
and the response variable, logistic regression uses a link function known as “log odds” in 
order to ensure that outcomes stay between zero and one. The odds of an event occurring 
is defined as the ratio of the probability that an event will occur to the probability that it 
will not. The conditional mean is expressed as ( | )E Y x where Y denotes the binary 
response variable, and x denotes a value of the covariate. If we let ( )xπ  represent the 
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 [10, p. 6]. 
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D. COVARIATE DESCRIPTIONS 
1. Gender 
Over 13 percent of the soldiers in this study are female. Gender was modeled as a 
nominal variable with 2 levels, male and female. 
2. Term of Service 
Term of service refers to the number of years of service required by a soldier’s 
enlistment contract. As shown in Table 1, three-year and four-year contracts are by far 
the most common.  “Blank” and “0” are errors.  “Z” represents an indefinite contract. 
Only senior enlisted personnel are offered an indefinite enlistment. Soldiers with an 
indefinite term of service get their ETS date extended each time they are promoted. Term 
of Service was modeled as a nominal variable with seven levels. Some low density levels 
were grouped together for modeling purposes. See Table 1. 
 
Table 1.   Term of Service Distribution 
Original Levels Levels Used in Model




2 5,990 2.0% 2 5,990 2.0% 45.8%
3 129,764 43.1% 3 129,764 43.1% 44.3%
4 110,514 36.7% 4 110,514 36.7% 41.7%
5 26,033 8.7% 5 26,033 8.7% 36.8%







blank, 0-1 3,176 1.1%
7-9,Z 7,013 2.3%
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3. Pay Grade 
Pay grade is closely related to military rank. E-1 is the lowest enlisted pay grade 
and E-9 is the highest. E-4 is the most common pay grade in the data set. Pay Grade was 
modeled as a nominal variable with nine levels. 
 
Table 2.   Pay Grade Distribution 
4. Reenlistment Prohibition Code 
Over 16 percent of the soldiers in this study are prohibited from reenlisting for 
various reasons. See the Appendix for more details. It is important to note that it is 
possible for soldiers to get their reenlistment prohibition lifted during their reenlistment 
window. In fact, 29.5 percent of soldiers in the data set who were prohibited from 
reenlisting with 12 METS eventually reenlisted or extended. Reenlistment Prohibition 
Code was modeled as a nominal variable with two levels, prohibited from reenlisting and 
eligible to reenlist.  
5. AFQT Score 
All prospective recruits take the Armed Forces Qualification Test prior to 
enlisting in the military. The AFQT score is a percentile with 0 being the lowest score 
and 99 the highest. AFQT scores can determine whether a potential recruit is allowed to 
enlist, and the type of MOSs the recruit is able to select. Table 3 shows the distribution of 
AFQT scores in the data set. The large number of soldiers with a score of “zero” may 
indicate some type of error in the data set. 
Pay Grade Soldiers % of Total % Retained
1 5,073 1.7% 10.2%
2 5,805 1.9% 27.6%
3 18,239 6.1% 34.3%
4 154,223 51.3% 36.8%
5 76,943 25.6% 48.1%
6 31,628 10.5% 61.3%
7 6,430 2.1% 48.9%
8 1,515 0.5% 25.2%
9 932 0.3% 26.4%
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Table 3.   AFQT Score Distribution 
AFQT Score could be modeled as a continuous variable or as a nominal variable. 
If it is modeled as a nominal variable, then there are 100 possible levels, so it will be 
important to determine how to group the scores into bins in order to reduce the number of 
levels. Either way it is important to examine how the conditional mean varies as AFQT 
score changes. Figure 3 indicates that the probability of reenlistment for soldiers with a 
score of zero is very low. The probability of reenlistment for soldiers with scores between 
1 and 37 is much higher, but also highly variable. Finally, for soldiers with scores 
between 38 and 99 there is a strong linear relationship between AFQT Score and the 
probability of reenlistment where higher scoring soldiers are less likely to reenlist.  
AFQT Score Soldiers % of Total % Retained
0 4,987 1.7% 32.4%
1-10 51 0.0% 56.9%
11-20 519 0.2% 45.1%
21-30 9,259 3.1% 46.9%
31-40 52,177 17.4% 46.6%
41-50 45,327 15.1% 44.3%
51-60 51,917 17.3% 42.5%
61-70 46,479 15.5% 40.7%
71-80 38,880 12.9% 38.9%
81-90 29,266 9.7% 37.0%
91-99 21,926 7.3% 34.9%
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Figure 3.   Log-odds of AFQT Scores 
Because of the presence of these three distinct groups, AFQT Score was modeled 
as a piecewise continuous variable. A new nominal variable was added to indicate 
whether the AFQT score is 0, between 1 and 37, or greater than 37. Then an interaction 
term was added so that the model uses a different coefficient for each of the three 
intervals. 
6. MOS 
There are 292 unique MOSs in the data set. For modeling purposes, the MOSs 
were grouped into 20 different branches. Table 4 contains a list of the branches and their 
frequency. MOS Branch was modeled as a nominal variable with 20 levels. 
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Table 4.   MOS Branch Distribution 
7. Marital Status 
Marital Status has nine levels, but more than 99 percent of soldiers belong to one 
of three groups: Single, Married, or Divorced. Soldiers in the remaining six levels were 
included in either the Married or Divorced levels as indicated in Table 5. 
MOS Branch Soldiers % of Total % Retained
Adjutant General's Corps 12,415 4.1% 53.3%
Air Defense Artillery 5,143 1.7% 43.9%
Armor 15,208 5.1% 36.4%
Aviation 12,210 4.1% 38.3%
Chemical Corps 5,260 1.8% 48.6%
Civil Affairs/PsyOp 739 0.3% 44.1%
Combat Medic 12,280 4.1% 42.5%
Corps of Engineers 15,795 5.3% 39.1%
Field Artillery 18,472 6.1% 37.8%
Finance Corps 1,978 0.7% 50.0%
Infantry 49,630 16.5% 34.3%
Low Density 1,693 0.6% 9.0%
Medical Service Corps 7,362 2.5% 52.7%
Military Intelligence 15,107 5.0% 37.2%
Military Police Corps 11,115 3.7% 39.1%
Ordnance Corps 38,880 12.9% 42.7%
Quartermaster Corps 38,639 12.9% 49.1%
Signal Corps 20,204 6.7% 41.7%
Special Forces 3,180 1.1% 62.5%
Transportation Corps 15,478 5.2% 44.9%
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Table 5.   Marital Status Distribution 
8. Number of Dependents 
Number of Dependents includes both adult dependents and children. 
 
Table 6.   Dependents Distribution 
Number of Dependents can be modeled as a continuous or nominal variable. 
Figure 4 indicates that Number of Dependents increases linearly up through eight 
dependents, but then declines thereafter. Adding a second order polynomial term to the 
 
 
Original Levels Levels Used in Model
Soldiers % of Total Soldiers % of Total % Retained
S Single 140,180 46.6% S Single 140,180 46.6% 34.1%
M Married 145,874 48.5%
Blank 16 0.0%
Z Unknown 146 0.1%
D Divorced 13,750 4.6%
A Annulled 96 0.0%
I Interlocutory 1 0.0%
L Legally Separated 534 0.2%




D Divorced 14,588 4.9%
Marital Status Marital Status
M Married 146,020
Dependents Soldiers % of Total % Retained
0 128,048 42.6% 33.7%
1 69,039 23.0% 42.0%
2 47,030 15.6% 47.8%
3 33,136 11.0% 52.0%
4 15,275 5.1% 56.2%
5 5,577 1.9% 57.3%
6 1,860 0.6% 58.1%
7 574 0.2% 61.8%
8 168 0.1% 63.1%
9 52 0.0% 50.0%
10 15 0.0% 53.3%
11 10 0.0% 50.0%
12 3 0.0% 33.3%
13 1 0.0% 0.0%
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model incorporates this parabolic shape and provides the best fit with the fewest degrees 
of freedom. Number of Dependents was modeled as a continuous variable with a second 
order polynomial term.  
 
Figure 4.   Distribution of Number of Dependents 
9. Number of Flags 
“Flag” is a term which means suspension of favorable personnel action. Soldiers 
can be flagged for a variety of reasons including failing a physical fitness test, exceeding 
body fat standards, misconduct, and many others. The data set was able to record at most 
two flag codes per soldier. Rather than focusing on the reason for being flagged, the 
covariate used in the model simply indicates how many times a soldier is flagged. 
Number of Flags was modeled as a nominal variable with three levels: 0, 1, and 2. 
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Table 7.   Distribution of Number of Flags 
10. Race 
Race was modeled as a nominal variable with six levels as shown in Table 8. 
 
Table 8.   Race Distribution 
11. Education Category 
Education Category was modeled as a nominal variable with five levels as shown 
in Table 9. 
 
Table 9.   Education Distribution 
12. Accession Type 
Accession Type indicates if a soldier served in the military prior to their current 
enlistment. The Army defines “prior service” as any applicant with more than 180 days 
of military service, or those who graduated from military job-training, regardless of time-
Flags Soldiers % of Total % Retained
0 208,869 69.4% 43.9%
1 69,961 23.3% 38.3%
2 21,958 7.3% 30.4%
Soldiers % of Total % Retained
C White 215,628 71.7% 37.8%
M Asian 11,594 3.9% 44.3%
N Black 55,688 18.5% 53.3%
R American Indian 3,138 1.0% 39.0%
X Other 14,115 4.7% 54.4%
Z Unknown 625 0.2% 23.8%
Race
Soldiers % of Total % Retained
CLG College 48,442 16.1% 44.7%
GED General Equivalency Diploma 11,211 3.7% 41.7%
HSG High School Graduate 231,786 77.1% 41.1%
NHS Non-High School Graduate 8,881 3.0% 40.0%
UNK Unknown 468 0.2% 22.4%
Education
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in-service [11]. As shown in Table 10, a small fraction of soldiers in the study have non-
Army prior service, such as Navy or Air Force experience. Most prior service soldiers 
were in the Army previously, had a break in service, and then decided to get back in the 
Army. Accession Type was modeled as a nominal variable with six levels. 
 
Table 10.   Accession Type Distribution 
13. Months of Active Federal Service (AFS) 
Figure 5 shows the distribution of years of AFS in the data set. Since all of the 
soldiers in the data set are 12 months from their ETS date, and most soldiers sign three-
year or four-year contracts, there are very few soldiers with less than two years of 
service. 
Soldiers % of Total % Retained
IMR Immediate Reenlistment 107,735 35.8% 52.2%
NPA Prior Service (Non-Army) 542 0.2% 44.8%
NPS Non Prior Service 167,694 55.8% 34.0%
OTG Other Gains 180 0.1% 18.3%
PSG Prior Service Gain 22,705 7.6% 50.2%




Figure 5.   Years of Active Federal Service (AFS) Bar Chart 
Just like AFQT Score, Months of AFS could be modeled as a continuous variable 
or as a nominal variable. Figure 6 shows that the log odds of reenlisting increases linearly 
as time-in-service increases until soldiers reach 227 months of service, which is one 
month short of 19 years of service, when it drops significantly. This is clearly related to 
retirement eligibility, which begins at 20 years of service. As soldiers get closer to 
retirement eligibility they become increasingly likely to reenlist, but once they qualify for 
retirement there is much less incentive to remain in the force. It is also true that 
promotions become more difficult to achieve later in a soldier’s career, and soldiers who 
are not selected for promotion are eventually forced out. 
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Figure 6.   Log-odds of Months of Active Federal Service 
Because of these two distinct groups, Months of AFS was modeled as a 
continuous variable and a second new binary variable was added to indicate whether the 
duration is less than 227 months, or greater than or equal to 227 months. Then an 
interaction term was added so that the model uses a different coefficient for the two 
intervals. 
14. Unemployment Rate 
The U.S. unemployment rate is obtained by dividing the number of unemployed 
individuals by the number of individuals in the labor force. As shown in Figure 7, the 
unemployment rate was less than 5 percent in 2006 and 2007, then rose dramatically in 
2008 and 2009, and remained above 9 percent in 2010 and most of 2011 [12]. 
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Figure 7.   U.S. Unemployment Rate and Consumer Confidence Index, 
 AN 2006–JUL 2011 [12, 13]  
Figure 8 shows that the log-odds of reenlisting exhibits a lot of variation as the 
unemployment rate changes. For some reason the log-odds are occasionally high even 
when the unemployment rate is low. The only area where there appears to be a linear 
relationship is when the unemployment rate goes above nine percent. At that point each 
incremental increase in the unemployment rate results in an increase in the log-odds of 
reenlisting. One possible explanation for these counterintuitive results during periods of 
low unemployment is that the Army increased the size and availability of reenlistment 
bonuses during these months in order to keep retention rates high. It is also possible that 
most people do not pay attention to the unemployment rate until it becomes very high and 
begins to get widespread media attention. This is speculation however, and additional 
research is required in order to adequately explain the results. 
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Figure 8.   Log-odds of Unemployment Rate 
Because of the parabolic shape, adding a second degree polynomial and/or a third 
degree polynomial to the univariate model produces the best fit. Since the third degree 
polynomial model is only slightly better than the second degree polynomial model, the 
third degree polynomial term was not included in order to keep the model as simple as 
possible and avoid overfitting.  
15. Consumer Confidence Index 
Consumer Confidence in the United States is reported by The Conference Board. 
The Conference Board Consumer Confidence Index® (CCI) is a barometer of the health 
of the U.S. economy from the perspective of the consumer. The index is based on 
approximately 3,000 completed questionnaires reflecting consumers’ perceptions of 
current business and employment conditions, as well as their expectations for the next six 
months regarding business conditions, employment, and income [13]. 
 31 
Based on the literature review, CCI seems like a promising covariate. 
Unfortunately, there is no discernible pattern to the reenlistment log-odds plot in Figure 
9. From Figure 7 it is also apparent that the CCI has a strong negative correlation with the 
unemployment rate, so perhaps it provides no new information anyway. For these two 
reasons, CCI was not explored any further.  
 
Figure 9.   Log-odds of Consumer Confidence Index 
E. VARIABLE SELECTION 
Univariate analysis of the 14 remaining covariates confirms that they are all 
significant with p-values less than 0.0001. The results when all of the covariates are 
included in a single model are shown in Table 11. All of the variables are highly 
significant and should remain in the model. 
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Table 11.   Wald Tests on Main Effects Model 
In order to check for two-way interaction effects, nearly every possible two-way 
interaction variable was added to the main effects model one at a time. Interaction 
variables with p-values less than 0.0001 were identified and added to the model 
collectively. Then the interaction variables were evaluated once again and removed if 
their p-values were higher than 0.01. This model building process is consistent with the 
strategy outlined in [10]. The results are shown in Table 12. 
Wald
Source Nparm DF ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq
Sex_Category 1 1 5.07 0.0243 *
Svc_Term 6 6 804.64 <.0001 *
Pay_Grade 8 8 2389.58 <.0001 *
Reenl_Prohib 1 1 2031.36 <.0001 *
MOS_Branch 19 19 1627.84 <.0001 *
Marital_Stat 2 2 118.86 <.0001 *
Flags 2 2 236.83 <.0001 *
Race 5 5 1456.84 <.0001 *
Education_Cat 4 4 12.66 0.0131 *
Accession_Type 5 5 409.44 <.0001 *
AFQT_Pcnt_QY 1 1 134.67 <.0001 *
AFQT_Pcnt_QY*AFQT_Bins 2 2 124.58 <.0001 *
Dependents 1 1 831.08 <.0001 *
Dependents*Dependents 1 1 96.76 <.0001 *
Months_AFS 1 1 0.32 0.5732
Months_AFS_Bins 1 1 9.58 0.0020 *
Months_AFS*Months_AFS_Bins 1 1 43.96 <.0001 *
Unemp_Rate 1 1 25.44 <.0001 *
Unemp_Rate*Unemp_Rate 1 1 221.94 <.0001 *
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Table 12.   Wald Tests on Model with Two-Way Interaction Terms 
Wald
Source Nparm DF ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq
Sex_Category 1 1 2.54 0.1110
Svc_Term 6 6 30.53 <.0001 *
Pay_Grade 8 8 456.89 <.0001 *
Reenl_Prohib 1 1 12.96 0.0003 *
MOS_Branch 19 19 281.93 <.0001 *
Marital_Stat 2 2 18.13 0.0001 *
Flags 2 2 1.75 0.4177
Race 5 5 46.94 <.0001 *
Education_Cat 4 4 13.14 0.0106 *
Accession_Type 5 5 246.01 <.0001 *
AFQT_Pcnt_QY 1 1 171.81 <.0001 *
AFQT_Pcnt_QY*AFQT_Bins 2 2 78.18 <.0001 *
Dependents 1 1 125.31 <.0001 *
Dependents*Dependents 1 1 20.03 <.0001 *
Months_AFS 1 1 1.88 0.1704
Months_AFS_Bins 1 1 12.17 0.0005 *
Months_AFS*Months_AFS_Bins 1 1 34.01 <.0001 *
Unemp_Rate 1 1 8.90 0.0028 *
Unemp_Rate*Unemp_Rate 1 1 181.13 <.0001 *
Sex_Category*Pay_Grade 8 8 49.11 <.0001 *
Sex_Category*Marital_Stat 2 2 72.74 <.0001 *
Svc_Term*Dependents 6 6 28.65 <.0001 *
Svc_Term*Race 30 30 152.68 <.0001 *
Svc_Term*Education_Cat 24 24 82.12 <.0001 *
Reenl_Prohib*MOS_Branch 19 19 55.25 <.0001 *
Reenl_Prohib*Dependents 1 1 28.11 <.0001 *
Reenl_Prohib*Flags 2 2 60.49 <.0001 *
Reenl_Prohib*Accession_Type 5 5 212.94 <.0001 *
Reenl_Prohib*Months_AFS 1 1 75.56 <.0001 *
MOS_Branch*Marital_Stat 38 38 168.80 <.0001 *
MOS_Branch*Unemp_Rate 19 19 107.33 <.0001 *
Marital_Stat*Dependents 2 2 20.30 <.0001 *
Marital_Stat*Race 10 10 72.53 <.0001 *
Flags*Race 10 10 64.53 <.0001 *
Flags*Education_Cat 8 8 32.83 <.0001 *
Flags*Months_AFS 2 2 17.07 0.0002 *
Flags*Unemp_Rate 2 2 351.98 <.0001 *
Education_Cat*Unemp_Rate 4 4 16.39 0.0025 *
Accession_Type*Unemp_Rate 5 5 27.19 <.0001 *
Months_AFS*Unemp_Rate 1 1 162.29 <.0001 *
 34 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 35 
IV. ASSESSING THE FIT OF THE MODEL 
A.  SUMMARY MEASURES OF GOODNESS-OF-FIT 
Table 13a shows several summary measures of the main effects model and Table 
13b shows the same measures for the two-way interaction model. Higher is better for R-
squared measures, and lower is better for the remaining measures such as residual mean 
squared error (RMSE) and misclassification rate. RMSE measures the average amount of 
squared error where error is defined as the difference between a soldier’s actual outcome 
and the model estimate. The misclassification rate indicates the fraction of soldier 
outcomes that the model predicts incorrectly. As the tables indicate, the two-way 











Yet another way to assess the goodness-of-fit of the models is by measuring the 
area under a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve. A ROC curve illustrates what 
will happen as the threshold for predicting a soldier will reenlist varies [10]. The most 
natural threshold is 0.5 so that the model will always select the most likely outcome. This 
threshold can be varied, however, in order to reduce the false positive rate or increase the 
true positive rate. When evaluating a ROC curve, higher area under the curve (AUC) is 
better. Figure 10 shows the ROC curve and AUC for the two models. As before, the two-
way interaction model performs slightly better. 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 10.   ROC Curve and AUC for (a) Main Effects Model, and (b) Two-Way 
Interaction Model 
B. CROSS-VALIDATION 
Perhaps the best technique for determining the quality of models is cross-
validation. Cross-validation involves splitting a data set into two parts, a training set and 
a test set. Then a model is generated using only the training data. This model must have 
the same covariates as the model built using the entire data set. Then predictions are 
made using the training model and the test set data, and the predictions are compared to 
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the actual outcomes. In this study the training set consisted of the first 60 months of data, 
and the test set consisted of the last 7 months of data. Predictions were made by MOS and 
pay grade. Table 14 shows the main effect model predictions and actual outcomes for 
soldiers in the seven month test period. 
There are many ways to assess the accuracy of model predictions. Residual sum 
of squares (RSS) sums the squared differences between the actual outcomes and the 












where iy  is the i
th actual value, ix  is the i
th covariate value, and ( )if x  is the predicted 
value. RSS treats all the errors equally, regardless of the magnitude of the values 
involved. For example, if the model predicts 870 Infantry E-4 reenlistments and there are 
actually 869, then the error is 1. The same is true if the model predicts zero Armor E-9 
reenlistments and there is actually one. Since the potential for large errors is much greater 
in categories where there are large numbers of soldiers involved, low RSS scores are 
usually due to accurately predicting the large groups of soldiers in a data set. 
Mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) does just the opposite. MAPE scales the 
errors based on the size of the actual values involved. Low MAPE scores are usually due 
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Table 14.   Actual Reenlistments and Main Effects Model Predictions for Soldiers in the 
Seven Month Test Period 
Actual Reenlistments
E-1 E-2 E-3 E-4 E-5 E-6 E-7 E-8 E-9 Total
Adjutant General's Corps 1 5 25 365 183 126 27 1 0 733
Air Defense Artillery 2 2 14 142 64 23 0 1 0 248
Armor 1 5 23 275 160 67 4 0 535
Aviation 3 0 14 245 157 80 5 1 505
Chemical Corps 1 1 10 143 85 34 2 0 276
Civil Affairs/PsyOp 0 9 10 17 5 0 1 42
Combat Medic 3 1 27 354 222 98 16 1 722
Corps of Engineers 2 12 40 516 185 88 10 0 853
Field Artillery 0 9 40 413 217 97 14 1 791
Finance Corps 1 2 44 25 16 2 0 0 90
Infantry 3 14 70 869 513 346 28 3 2 1,848
Low Density 1 0 0 0 3 4
Medical Service Corps 0 2 7 172 126 54 2 0 0 363
Military Intelligence 1 3 16 198 210 186 30 1 0 645
Military Police Corps 0 4 17 303 185 93 14 0 616
Ordnance Corps 11 24 95 1,068 497 199 16 2 0 1,912
Quartermaster Corps 6 22 93 1,271 602 208 17 2 0 2,221
Signal Corps 3 6 40 575 362 145 19 0 0 1,150
Special Forces 8 11 147 55 1 0 222
Transportation Corps 1 6 37 497 281 93 6 1 0 922
Total 40 116 570 7,467 4,095 2,117 272 14 7 14,698
Predicted Reenlistments
E-1 E-2 E-3 E-4 E-5 E-6 E-7 E-8 E-9 Total
Adjutant General's Corps 2.0 5.7 27.7 345.0 194.6 118.4 29.3 2.9 0.6 726.5
Air Defense Artillery 1.0 4.7 13.9 158.2 55.5 27.9 0.1 0.5 0.5 262.5
Armor 1.4 5.0 23.0 263.5 172.0 77.8 5.0 1.4 549.3
Aviation 1.0 1.5 14.6 262.1 184.7 71.0 6.4 0.9 542.2
Chemical Corps 1.0 3.1 11.1 133.6 92.1 33.2 1.9 0.2 276.2
Civil Affairs/PsyOp 0.1 7.4 23.3 16.7 3.5 0.6 0.4 52.0
Combat Medic 1.8 3.3 31.3 341.9 218.7 87.8 16.1 0.5 701.5
Corps of Engineers 4.7 13.9 50.9 469.3 164.3 85.3 10.1 0.3 798.8
Field Artillery 1.6 9.0 35.6 353.2 200.6 95.1 13.6 1.0 709.8
Finance Corps 0.5 4.3 47.1 17.1 12.4 1.6 0.1 0.3 83.4
Infantry 6.1 18.1 72.3 890.0 440.8 305.0 26.8 0.7 1.3 1,761.0
Low Density 12.4 0.1 0.6 0.4 1.5 15.1
Medical Service Corps 1.1 3.9 16.0 194.2 128.5 54.0 4.4 0.2 0.6 403.0
Military Intelligence 0.5 3.0 11.8 183.2 185.4 199.2 35.6 0.5 0.7 619.9
Military Police Corps 0.3 3.3 19.0 322.7 177.2 79.4 12.7 0.3 614.9
Ordnance Corps 7.1 27.5 108.3 1,060.1 496.8 180.2 17.2 2.0 1.0 1,900.2
Quartermaster Corps 8.6 34.2 139.5 1,374.9 591.3 197.9 16.6 3.9 1.5 2,368.4
Signal Corps 2.9 10.4 39.6 528.0 333.1 134.8 22.4 0.5 0.5 1,072.3
Special Forces 6.0 7.8 152.9 56.5 1.7 0.4 225.3
Transportation Corps 4.6 11.8 47.7 546.6 274.8 95.6 7.2 1.1 0.3 989.6
Total 58.8 158.7 667.3 7,487.8 3,958.7 2,024.7 287.0 16.4 12.5 14,671.9
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Tables 15 and 16 show the results of the main effects model, the two-way 
interaction model, and a naïve model. A naïve model assumes that all soldiers have a 
probability of reenlistment equal to the mean reenlistment rate of the soldiers in the 
training set. In this case the training set reenlistment rate was 41.73 percent. Fortunately 
both of the regression models perform much better than the naïve model. The two-way 
interaction model has the lowest MAPE, but the main effects model has the lowest RSS 
and predicts the total number of reenlistments more accurately. This means that the main 
effects model is the best option for predicting the large groups of soldiers, but the two-
way interaction model is better at predicting small groups. 
 
Table 15.   Cross Validation Results: RSS and MAPE 
 
Table 16.   Cross Validation Results: Expected Reenlistments 
  
Models RSS MAPE
Main Effects Model 39,494.9 42.1%
2-Way Interaction Model 44,187.5 32.1%













Main Effects Model 14,498 14,671.9 14,844 -26.1
2-Way Interaction Model 14,605 14,777.5 14,953 79.5
Naïve Model N/A 14,932.4 N/A 234.4
14,698
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V. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The Army currently uses time series models to forecast personnel losses. Time 
series models can provide accurate predictions but offer no insights into the underlying 
causes of loss behavior. In order to quantify the various forces that influence retention 
rates, a regression model is necessary. A review of relevant literature reveals numerous 
potential covariates that may predict soldier retention rates. Most of these covariates were 
available in the data set and were included in two logistic regression models. The first 
model includes 14 main effects. The second model includes the same 14 main effects 
plus 21 highly significant two-way interaction terms. The two-way interaction model 
performs slightly better than the main effects model on all the summary measures, but the 
cross-validation results are mixed. Since the two-way interaction model is much more 
complicated to produce, and does not seem to generate results that are clearly better, the 
main effects model is probably the best option in most cases. Overall, both models 
estimate the total number of personnel that would reenlist over a seven-month test period 
fairly well. If a logistic regression model like the one described in this thesis was 
combined with an attrition model for soldiers who are not in their reenlistment window, it 
would be possible to make loss estimates for the entire active component enlisted force. 
These results could then serve as check on the current time series model estimates. 
B. FOLLOW-UP RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Explore Additional Covariates 
Several studies have focused on the impact of combat deployments on soldier 
retention. Most find that a limited number of deployments with adequate recovery time 
can actually boost retention rates, but frequent deployments with little recovery time 
usually reduce retention rates. In order to model this effect, one or more covariates must 
be carefully chosen. For instance, measuring the total number of combat deployments per 
soldier does not indicate the duration of the deployments, the amount of recovery time 
between them, or how long it has been since the soldier last deployed. A better measure 
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might be the proportion of months deployed during the soldier’s current term of service. 
This covariate would focus only on recent deployments, the proportion of months 
deployed rather than the number of deployments, and account for different enlistment 
term lengths. Interaction effects are also likely to be present. Soldiers in combat MOSs 
presumably have different experiences than soldiers in less dangerous support roles, and 
soldiers with families may be less willing to deploy repeatedly than single soldiers. 
Another area that deserves more attention in the model is pecuniary factors. Since 
SRBs are the primary tool the Army uses to encourage reenlistments, it would be very 
useful to know the amount of money soldiers were eligible to receive for reenlisting. This 
would require a significant amount of historical research since bonus programs change all 
the time, and are often targeted only to soldiers that meet very specific criteria. Although 
information about soldiers that took SRBs must surely exist, the real challenge would be 
determining how much money soldiers declined. 
The Rand study examining military and civilian pay [6] demonstrates that 
measuring changes in military compensation relative to civilian compensation would also 
be useful. This will be a difficult variable to quantify since compensation in the civilian 
workforce can vary dramatically by occupation, education level, location, and other 
factors. It may also to be difficult to quantify the value of healthcare benefits and pension 
income which only begin once a soldier gets out of the Army if they have at least 20 
years of service. 
2. Forecast Losses for the Entire Enlisted Force 
In order to forecast losses for the entire enlisted force, additional logistic 
regression models are required in order to forecast losses for soldiers with fewer than 12 
months until their ETS date, and an attrition model is necessary in order to forecast losses 
for soldiers with more than 12 months until their ETS date. This would be a very large 
project, but there is already an abundance of literature on attrition models so the 
researcher does not need to design either type of model from scratch. Once completed, 
the probability of retention could be estimated for every soldier over the next 12 months 
and then the results can easily be aggregated using a pivot table. The results could be 
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used to check time series model results, provide insights into the causes of current loss 
behavior, and provide estimates of the impact of changing various Army retention 
policies on future retention rates. 
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APPENDIX: REENLISTMENT PROHIBITION CODE 
DISTRIBUTION 
 





Description Soldiers % of Total
Fully Eligible for Immediate Reenlistment 251,568 83.64%
10 Fully Eligible for Immediate Reenlistment 434 0.14%
11 Subject to Involuntary Separation 4,369 1.45%
9A Lost Time 148 0.05%
9B Adverse Action Flag 31 0.01%
9C Denied Retention by SA – Commander Quality 44 0.01%
9D Pending Security Clearance Determination 537 0.18%
9E Physical Readiness 8,181 2.72%
9F Denied Retention by Separation Authority 5 0.00%
9G Grade (Soldier is within 24 months of ETS and exceeds RCP for Current Grade) 1,581 0.53%
9H Pending MEB/PEB/MMRB 4,645 1.54%
9I Non-Promotable Status 67 0.02%
9J Involuntary Separation under Qualitative Service Program 2 0.00%
9K Field Bar to Reenlistment 1,394 0.46%
9L Involuntary Separation under Qualitative Management Program 6 0.00%
9M Approved Retirement under Qualitative Management Program 23 0.01%
9N Courts-Martial Conviction 38 0.01%
9O Age (Restricted from Retention Due to Maximum Age Limitations) 1 0.00%
9P Loss of Qualification in PMOS 474 0.16%
9Q Declination of Continued Service Statement 3,963 1.32%
9S Conscientious Objector 4 0.00%
9T Approved Involuntary Separation 313 0.10%
9V Pending Separation (Command or Soldier initiated separations) 956 0.32%
9W Not Eligible Due to SSG NCOER/NCOES Eligibility Requirements 270 0.09%
9X Other (Prohibitions not otherwise identified) 9,131 3.04%
9Y Retirement (Application for retirement has been approved) 1,308 0.43%
9Z Weight (Does not meet acceptable weight standards) 11,295 3.76%
300,788 100.00%
 46 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 
 47 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
[1]  H. Golding and A. Adedeji,  “Recruiting, retention, and future levels of military 
personnel,”  United States Congressional Budget Office, Washington, DC, Oct. 
2006. 
[2]  J. R. Hosek, J. Kavanagh, and L. Miller, “How deployments affect service 
members,” Rand, Santa Monica, CA, 2006. 
[3] M. L. Hansen and S. Nataraj, “Expectations about civilian labor markets and 
Army officer retention,” Rand, Santa Monica, CA, 2011. 
[4]  B. J. Asch, P. Heaton, J. Hosek, F. Martorell, C. Simon, and J. T. Warner, “Cash 
incentives and military enlistment, attrition, and reenlistment,” Rand, Santa 
Monica, CA, 2010. 
[5]  M. C. Young, U. C. Kubisiak, P. J. Legree, and T. R. Tremble, "Understanding 
and managing the career continuance of enlisted soldiers," U.S. Army Research 
Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Fort Belvoir, VA, 2010, vol. 
1280.  
[6]  J. R. Hosek, B. J. Asch, and M. G. Mattock, "Should the increase in military pay 
be slowed?" Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2012.  
[7]  M. K. Brauner, K. L. Lawson, W. T. Mickelson, J. Adams, and J. M. Chaiken, 
“Time series models for predicting monthly losses of Air Force enlisted 
personnel,” Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 1991. 
[8]  A. Nelson, "Predicting enlisted reenlistment rates," M.S. thesis, Dept. Operations 
Research, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2010.  
[9]  S. C. Orrick, "Forecasting Marine Corps enlisted losses," M.S. thesis, Dept. 
Operations Research, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008.  
[10]  D. W. Hosmer and S. Lemeshow, Applied Logistic Regression. New York: Wiley, 
2000. 
[11]  R. Powers. About.com, Prior Service Enlistments [Online]. Available: 
http://usmilitary.about.com/od/joiningthemilitary/a/priorservice.htm. Retrieved: 
2013, Apr 28. 
[12]  United States Bureau of Labor Statistics. Unemployment Rate – Civilian Labor 
Force Series Id: LNS14000000 [Online]. Available: http://data.bls.gov/cgi-
bin/surveymost?ln. Retrieved: 2012, Sep 23. 
 48 
[13] TradingEconomics.com. United States Consumer Confidence [Online]. Available: 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/united-states/consumer-confidence. Retrieved: 
2012, Sep 23. 
 49 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
